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If companies rely strongly on internal R&D and existing networks their ability to introduce radical 
innovations may suffer. Opening up to new idea sources may provide a solution. Incumbent 
companies, however, often suffer from the tendency to reject radical ideas from unusual sources. 
This study investigates how social integration mechanisms (coordination, socialisation, and 
systems mechanisms) influence an incumbent steel company’s absorptive capacity (AC). A micro-
level analysis of two radical ideas from unusual sources contributes to AC and radical innovation 
literatures by exploring relationships between social integration mechanisms and four AC 
capabilities (acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation). The findings suggest that 
AC capabilities are context specific with respect to innovation novelty and idea source. The results 
emphasize the negative sides of socialisation and formalisation mechanisms, and the positive 
effects of coordination mechanisms on the AC capabilities in such high uncertainty contexts. 
 







The ability to acquire and develop radical ideas is an important antecedent of radical 
innovation (Frishammar et al. 2016) and competitive advantage (O’Connor 2008). The external 
networks that incumbent companies interact with are, however, often tightly integrated and 
inwardly focused so that they perform well in diffusing existing knowledge but are poorly suitable 
for the exploration of new perspectives (Birkinshaw, Bessant, and Delbridge 2007; Chang et al. 
2012; Stringer 2000). Not only are the companies not looking for ideas from new sources – if such 
ideas come across, they may be unable to benefit from them (Katz and Allen 1982). Radical ideas 
are highly uncertain and if they originate from unusual sources they are perceived as even more 
risky and are often rejected (Chesbrough 2006). 
Organizations with high absorptive capacity (AC), i.e. the ability to ‘recognize the value 
of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’ (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990, 128), can reach higher innovation performance (Volberda, Foss, and Lyles 2010) and 
introduce more radical innovations (Enkel and Heil 2014; Forés and Camisón 2016; Ritala and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2013). AC literature suggests that the ability to benefit from new ideas 
can be studied by looking at social integration mechanisms (SIMs) which facilitate 
intraorganizational knowledge sharing and exploitation (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005). This 
study analyses two projects in an incumbent global steel company and investigates how SIMs 
influence the absorption of radical ideas from unusual sources.  
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Radical ideas and innovations 
Radical innovations are here defined as products, services, or processes which encompass 
novel technologies or require new market structures, and have the potential to create paradigm 
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shifts at the level of the world, the market, or the industry (Garcia and Calantone 2002). Such 
innovations entail significant financial rewards (Kyriakopoulos, Hughes, and Hughes 2015), 
customer benefits (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2003), and competitive advantages (O’Connor 
2008). Incumbent companies, however, typically have organizational inhibitors which limit their 
search for new ideas and filter out risky propositions despite of their potential (Bessant et al. 2005; 
Chang et al. 2012). Radical ideas are highly original and creative, challenge established practices, 
roles, interests, and power structures within organizations (Sijbom et al. 2014), and may require 
new cognitive frames (Bessant et al. 2014). If they are evaluated from existing cognitive frames 
they are easy to reject based on high uncertainties (O’Connor and Rice 2013). 
Extant research suggests that standard procedures for developing ideas are not useful for 
radical ideas (Robbins and O’Corman 2014). Efficiency-oriented stage-gate systems (Bessant et 
al. 2014) and conventional market research (Frishammar et al. 2016) may be unsuitable because 
of nonlinear development trajectories (Robbins and O’Corman 2015) and unknown ultimate uses 
and markets (O’Connor and Rice 2013). Instead, they may benefit from iterative experimentations 
(Chang et al. 2012) and cross-functional collaboration (Stringer 2000). Formal control may be 
detrimental for radical ideas (Chiesa et al. 2009), and championing individuals and teams should 
be given high autonomy (Chiu et al. 2016) to develop them in a bottom-up fashion (Reid and de 
Brentani 2004). Sometimes projects may proceed in secret without official project status, 
resources, or managerial attention (Reid and de Brentani 2004). 
Incumbent companies often rely strongly on internal R&D and existing external networks 
(Birkinshaw, Bessant, and Delbridge 2007; Chang et al. 2012; Stringer 2000). Radical innovation, 
however, may benefit from new contacts: developing peripheral vision (Day and Schoemaker 
2004) and weak ties (Phillips et al. 2006), reaching out beyond current relationships (O’Connor 
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and McDermott 2004), combination over multiple knowledge domains (Schoenmakers and 
Duysters 2010), increasing search breadth (Cai, Smart, and Liu 2014), and linkages with 
heterogeneous populations (Bessant et al. 2005). Collaboration with entrepreneurs (Chandy and 
Tellis 2000), employees (Kesting and Ulhøi 2010), users (Abrell et al. 2016), and other industries 
(Datta and Jessup 2013) may generate radical ideas. Ideas from unusual sources can, however, be 
perceived as highly risky (Chesbrough 2006). Since radical ideas are uncertain to start with, R&D 
teams may reject radical ideas from unusual sources (Burcharth, Knudsen, and Søndergaard 2014; 
Katz and Allen 1982).  
2.2 Absorptive capacity and social integration mechanisms 
According to Zahra and George (2002), AC is comprised of four organizational 
capabilities: acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation. Acquisition considers 
identifying and gaining access to externally generated knowledge. Assimilation denotes the 
capability to analyse, process, interpret, and understand new knowledge. Transformation refers to 
how the new knowledge is combined with existing knowledge. Finally, exploitation stands for the 
incorporation of the new knowledge in the company’s operations. Todorova and Durisin (2007) 
argue that assimilation and transformation should be considered as alternatives in the absorption 
process (see Figure 1). If new knowledge fits into existing cognitive structures well enough, it can 
be assimilated into them. Transformation takes place when new cognitive structures have to be 
built via combination.  
The level of AC has been linked to prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) 
and the compatibility between the parties of knowledge transfer (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). 
Additionally, SIMs which facilitate the integration of knowledge, have been noted as antecedents 
of AC. Well-working mechanisms are needed to overcome barriers in knowledge exchange by 
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facilitating interactions and information flows (Zahra and George, 2002). Van den Bosch, 
Volberda, and de Boer (1999) divide SIMs into three categories: socialisation mechanisms, 
coordination mechanisms, and systems mechanisms. Table 1 reviews extant studies on SIMs.  
 
 
Figure 1. A model of AC. Modified from Todorova and Durisin (2007, 776). 
Socialisation mechanisms facilitate the creation of common codes of communication and 
reduce conflicting goals by specifying tacit rules for appropriate action and structuring social 
experiences (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005). Teaching new employees unit-specific 
languages, values, beliefs, and norms creates strong links between them which facilitates 
communication and comprehension. Connectedness, i.e. the density of networks, is noted to 
govern interactions within the organization (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005). Strong and 
extensive ties within a specific group promote trust, improve cooperation, and facilitate knowledge 
exchange (Ebers and Maurer 2014; Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005; Todorova and Durisin 
2007). Despite of their benefits, socialisation mechanisms may sometimes inhibit AC as they 
increase reliance on a specific set of knowledge sources which may result in myopia and inertia 
due to ‘group think’ (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005; Van Lancker et al. 2016). 
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Coordination mechanisms facilitate knowledge transfer across disciplinary, hierarchical, 
and functional borders and ensure that individuals with various backgrounds and expertise are 
connected (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005). They help integrate new knowledge into existing 
knowledge bases, create shared interpretations of problems, and overcome differences. Well-
connected and socially adept individuals are important in linking acquired and assimilated 
knowledge to those who can transform and exploit it (Ebers and Maurer 2014; Jones 2006; 
Tortoriello 2015). Gatekeepers, boundary spanners, and change agents may promote formal and 
informal communication across and within companies and drive changes at the levels of 
organization, routines, and strategy (Jones 2006). 
Finally, systems mechanisms such as manuals, policies, and procedures are formal and 
explicit methods to control organizational behaviour. They provide organizational memory for 
handling recurring events, establish patterns of organizational action (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 
2005), facilitate knowledge flows, and maintain a consistent view of the firm’s knowledge base 
(Cepeda-Carrion, Cegarra-Navarro, and Jimenez-Jimenez 2012; Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 
2005; Roberts 2015). Systems mechanisms may have their downsides as codified rules may not 
allow changes of plans when new unexpected ideas or events arise (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 
2005). 
AC has been identified to promote radical innovation (Enkel and Heil 2014; Forés and 
Camisón 2016; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2013) but differences between the absorption 
processes of radical and incremental ideas have remained uncharted. Furthermore, the field has 
mostly ignored intraorganizational factors at the level of individuals and groups (Easterby-Smith 
et al. 2008; Lane, Koka, and Pathak 2006; Martinkenaite and Breunig 2016; Volberda, Foss, and 
Lyles 2010), which this study addresses. 
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Table 1: SIMs in the AC literature 
Category Mechanism AC capability 
Socialisation 
mechanisms 
Connectedness (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005) Assimilation, transformation, exploitation 
Connectedness (Roberts 2015; Todorova and 
Durisin 2007) 
Acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
exploitation  
Social networks (Todorova and Durisin 2007) Acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
exploitation 
Social networks (Zahra and George 2002) Assimilation, transformation 
Trust and strong ties (Ebers and Maurer 2014) Acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
exploitation  
Shared values and norms (Lewin, Massini, and 
Peeters 2010) 
Acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
exploitation  
Unit-specific language, values, and beliefs (Jansen, 





Formal SIMs, e.g. organizational structures, 
coordinators (Zahra and George 2002) 
Assimilation, transformation 
Structures and routines for knowledge transfer 
(Matusik and Heeley 2005) 
Acquisition, assimilation 
Informal hall talk, cross-functional communication 
(Roberts 2015) 
Not defined 
Cross-functional interfaces and job rotation 
(Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005) 
Acquisition, assimilation, transformation 
Participation in decision making (Jansen, Bosch, 
and Volberda 2005) 
Acquisition, transformation 
Relational learning (e.g. knowledge sharing 
routines, joint teams, face-to -face meetings) (Leal-
Rodríguez et al. 2014) 
Linking potential AC (acquisition, 
assimilation) and realised AC 
(transformation, exploitation) 
Cross-functional interactions, participatory 
leadership (Hotho, Becker-Ritterspach, and Saka-
Helmhout 2012) 
Not defined 
Boundary spanners (Ebers and Maurer 2014) Acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
exploitation 
Boundary spanners (Tortoriello 2015) Not defined 
Gatekeepers and boundary spanners (Jones 2006) Acquisition, assimilation 
Change agents (Jones 2006) Transformation, exploitation 
Systems 
mechanisms 
Formalisation (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005) Transformation, exploitation 
Routinisation (Jansen, Bosch, and Volberda 2005) (Negative effects) acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation 
Data integration (Roberts 2015) Acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
exploitation 
Information systems capabilities (Cepeda-Carrion, 
Cegarra-Navarro, and Jimenez-Jimenez 2012) 
Linking potential AC and realised AC 
 
3. Methodology and data 
Case study methodology is adopted as it is suitable for acquiring rich data and for 
identifying emerging themes and patterns (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Single case design is 
appropriate if the case represents extreme or unique circumstances or is exceptionally revelatory 
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(Yin 2003). The case should be selected based on theoretical fit with the studied topic (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner 2007). This study investigates a global steel company, referred to as Steel Inc. The 
company has a steady market position, a successful track record in introducing incremental 
innovations, and some experience in developing radical ideas into innovative products and 
processes.  
Steel Inc. is chosen for several reasons. First, it is an incumbent company interested in 
developing radical innovations, which allows investigation of tensions between core capabilities 
and renewal (Leonard-Barton 1992). Second, it provided access to two radical innovation projects 
originating from unusual idea sources enabling the investigation of a novel context. Third, the case 
comprises one successful and one failed project which diminishes survivorship bias from focusing 
only on success stories. Fourth, the industry context is considered to be challenging for the 
development of radical innovations. Studying such extreme circumstances is likely to provide 
novel insights (Yin 2003). 
Semi-structured interviews with involved employees and the inventors are the main data 
source. In selecting the interviewees, the first step was to ask a senior R&D Director to identify 
relevant employees. The initial sample was complemented with snowball sampling (Patton 2014). 
The interview guide covered the ideas’ journeys and mechanisms that promoted or inhibited their 
development. Additional interviews were conducted on the company’s innovation management 
system for providing context and identifying special characteristics of the two projects. The word 
‘project’ is here used in a broad sense including events that occurred both before and after official 
project statuses were granted for the development of the ideas.  
Total of 21 interviews, 1–2 hours each, were conducted, recorded, and transcribed verbatim 
(Table 2). At least two researchers participated in all interviews. To protect the confidentiality and 
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anonymity of the informants and ensure access to data, the research team signed non-disclosure 
agreements (NDA) with the organization and used a pseudonym for its name (Bell and Bryman 
2007). The company also provided access to additional data (total amount of ~100 sheets) 
including internal memos and e-mail correspondence related to the projects, innovation process 
diagrams, and organizational charts.  
Table 2: Interviewee profiles 


















Vice President  
R&D Director  
R&D Manager  
Director, Business Model Development  
 
The projects were first analysed individually. Project descriptions were written to create 
coherent representations of the chains of events. Interview transcripts and relevant documents were 
coded using the Atlas.ti computer programme. At first, the data was coded inductively in a data-
driven fashion to identify events, actions, and their outcomes in the idea journeys and the 
interviewees’ explanations of their driving forces and inhibitors.  
Table 3: Indicators, key project elements, and illustrative quotations of AC capabilities 
Indicators proposed in the literature Key elements in the case 
projects 
Illustrative quotations  
Aquisition 
- Ability to detect opportunities in the 
environment (Noblet, Simon and 
Parent 2011) 
- Detailed observation of external 
sources of new technologies 
(Lichtenthaler 2009) 
- Effective routines to identify, value, 
and import new knowledge (Roberts 
2015) 
- Management that actively seeks 
innovative ideas (Cepeda-Carrion, 
Cegarra-Navarro and Jimenez-
Jimenez 2012) 
- Gaining access to radical 
ideas from different sources. 
- Managerial interest in 
radical ideas at different 
hierarchical levels. 
- Recognizing the initial value 
of radical ideas. 
‘Our CEO received a letter from 
the inventor and took the idea 
seriously from the very 
beginning. He then sent a couple 
of specialists to visit him and 
discuss potential collaboration.’ 





- Ability to quickly understand new 
opportunities to serve clients (Jansen, 
Bosch, and Volberda 2005) 
- Ability to use employees’ 
knowledge, experience and 
competency in the interpretation of 
new knowledge (Forés and Camison 
2016) 
- Capability to assimilate new 
technologies and innovations that are 
useful or have proven potential 
(Forés and Camisón 2016) 
- Investigating technological 
and commercial aspects of 
the idea. 
- Conducting manufacturing 
tests.  
- Leveraging relevant 
knowledge, experience and 
competency in 
understanding the idea. 
‘We had to conduct the first 
manufacturing test in secret 
because we couldn’t get a 
permission for it. Others 
explicitly opposed the idea: if it 
was possible someone else would 
have invented it already.’ 




- Ability to challenge established 
thinking or practices (Noblet, Simon 
and Parent 2011) 
- Ability to understand the 
consequences of changing market 
demands in terms of new products 
and services (Jansen et al., 2005; 
Leal-Rodríguez et al. 2014) 
- Firm’s capability to adapt 
technologies designed by others to its 
particular needs (Forés and Camisón 
2016) 
- Rethinking the company’s 
scope. 
- Finding new application 
areas. 
‘After we acquired hard proof 
from the first manufacturing 
tests, things started slowly 
progressing, but even then we 
struggled to do more tests. When 
we found the first customers, we 
still had to fight to get money for 
the needed investments. To put it 
bluntly, we wasted a lot of time 
by arguing with each other.’ 
(indicates low transformation 
capability) 
Exploitation 
- Ability to apply and implement 
technologies in new products 
(Lichtenthaler 2009) 
- Application of the assimilated 
external knowledge (Noblet, Simon, 
and Parent 2011) 
- Capability to put technological 
knowledge into product and process 
patents (Forés and Camisón 2016) 
- Capability to use and exploit new 
knowledge in the workplace to 
respond quickly to environment 
changes (Forés and Camisón 2016) 
- Introducing new products. 
- New market creation 
- Initiating operations. 
‘We realised that we can also 
make new kinds of products with 
the new process. We started to 
systematically look for markets 
for a new type of steel. This 
required close collaboration with 
sales, marketing, and technical 
support teams. There was not 
much domestic demand so we put 
effort to market the new products 
globally.’ (indicates high 
exploitation capability) 
 
 Studies on AC capabilities were investigated to generate a list of indicators which suggest 
high capability levels. These indicators helped operationalize the capabilities and identify elements 
in the projects that could be used to evaluate AC performance (Table 3). AC levels were assessed 
by looking for comments which indicate high/low success in key elements associated with each 
capability. If there was a balance of positive and negative assessments of a capability the level was 
considered to be medium. 
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Similarly, extant studies on SIMs (Table 1) guided the analysis by providing lists of 
relevant SIMs for identifying and categorizing mechanisms from the projects (Table 4). Typically, 
mentions of SIMs appeared in relation to key capability elements which made possible to link 
SIMs and AC capabilities together (Table 7). The codes and categorisations were constantly 
compared to the data to ensure their consistency. Finally, the projects were compared by arranging 
them into tables and matching the identified patterns. Key informants were met several times to 
discuss emerging findings and confirm their validity. Comparability of the findings is supported 
by the inclusion of the general interviews and documents, which enable triangulation among 
different data at the project and organizational levels (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
Table 4: Examples of identified SIMs with illustrative quotations 







‘Those who tinker around in their garage are better equipped to interact with this kind 
of person than those who have spent their career in a laboratory looking through a 
microscope.’ 
 
‘They have been interested but I don’t always know how to validate my idea. Many 
times there’s a language barrier, they speak a different language than us. I haven’t had 






‘It’s amazing how well our coffee room discussions advance the development projects. 
There are several ongoing discussions all the time, and that’s how the knowledge is 
transmitted. Of course some of the knowledge is irrelevant but some of it is extremely 
valuable.’ 
 
‘We have an ongoing informal meeting procedure, like a brainstorming session for 
current topics. When people have ideas, thoughts, problems, or technical stuff there’s 
the whole group advising and supporting them.’ 
 
4. Case description 
Steel Inc. is a European steel company that operates globally. Similar to other process 
industries its business is characterized by high R&D intensity, complexity, uncertainty, asset-
intensiveness, and costly scaling-up from idea to full-scale production (Kurkkio, Frishammar, and 
Lichtenthaler 2011). The two projects (Table 5) are both radical in that they encompass new steel 
production processes which enable the production of new products with paradigm-shifting 
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properties. The idea sources can be considered unusual since ideas typically originate from the 
R&D unit or a stable set of partners such as universities and research centres.  
Table 5: Project information 
 Project 1 Project 2 
Inventor Engineer (internal idea) Entrepreneur (external idea) 
Innovation type Process innovation that enables new products Process innovation that enables new 
products 
Innovation novelty Radical (new-to-the-world) Radical (new-to-the-world) 
Outcome Successful adoption of a new process led to the 
introduction of multiple new products. 
Failure: rejected by the R&D unit 
 
The first idea was discovered by an engineer within Steel Inc. He faced initial difficulties in 
convincing managers to begin idea development. Eventually, a team emerged to promote the idea 
in secret. After the first manufacturing tests, they started to get wider support. Subsequently, it was 
granted a formal project status and resources. Finally, the project led to the creation of multiple 
new products and new markets. 
 The second idea was proposed by an entrepreneur who operates a small company producing 
steel-based products. The CEO of Steel Inc. got interested in the idea and commissioned the R&D 
unit to investigate its potential. The idea was not able to evoke interest within the unit. For some 
time, it remained at a pre-evaluation stage with low priority but in the end, the investigations were 
shut down before manufacturing tests. For detailed project descriptions see the Supplementary 
Online Material. 
5. Findings 
Despite of continuous collaboration with external partners, Steel Inc. faced difficulties in 
integrating the ideas (Table 6). While only one of the ideas had problems with acquisition, 
assimilation and transformation were difficult for both. High uncertainties and incompatibility 
with the prevailing capabilities and business scope hindered assimilation. Assimilation attempts 
were nevertheless necessary for understanding the ideas and initiating company-wide 
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transformation efforts. Project 1 was able to advance through these phases, whereas project 2 was 
restrained by the lack of serious assimilation attempts. Differences in the outcomes of the projects 
were explained by how they were able to utilise SIMs (Table 7). 
Table 6: AC capability levels 
AC capability Project 1 Project 2 
Acquisition Low 
The idea originated within the company and was 
acknowledged after the persistent initiatives of the 
inventor. 
High 
An entrepreneur contacted the case 
company CEO with a new steel 
manufacturing method. There were no 
previous relations between the parties. 
Assimilation Low 
Unusual source of the idea and the inventor’s lack 
of technical expertise delayed its analysis. 
Uncertainties regarding the idea’s potential and 
feasibility delayed manufacturing tests. 
Low 
NDA limited informal discussions about 
the idea and impeded idea development. 
Because of low priority, only theoretical 
analysis was performed. Metallurgical 
analysis and manufacturing tests were not 
conducted.  
Transformation Medium 
Initially the idea was not able to challenge existing 
cognitive structures. Later, the organization was 
convinced by manufacturing test results and 
project team credibility. This generated a search 
for new application areas which transformed how 
the company saw its business scope and strengths. 
Low 
Existing perceptions of the company’s 
scope and capabilities remained dominant. 
The idea was considered incompatible 
with them and was rejected. 
Exploitation High 
The innovation was used to produce better quality 
products with lower costs in an existing product 
group. In addition, a new product group was 
established and a new market created around it. 
Low 
The case company did not try to exploit 
the idea. The inventor continued to work 
with the technology under his own small 
business.  
 
5.1 Socialisation mechanisms 
The R&D unit in Steel Inc. is a highly socialised community. Its members share similar 
background, education, and language, and understanding of idea requirements. These mechanisms 
increase trust and knowledge transfer efficiency but limit knowledge exchange outside the unit. 
The inventors faced difficulties in communicating with R&D employees because of their lack of 
status and proficiency in theoretical discussions on metallurgy. According to an R&D manager: 
‘If you’re not in a technical position it will be difficult to convince others. But if a technical 
employee, who makes decisions on projects all the time, presents an idea, nobody goes against 
14 
 
him.’ Furthermore, both inventors were confronted with organizational norms and values that 
shunned risky projects: having supported unsuccessful projects was seen as a professional failure. 
In project 1, the resistance was overcome with dense connections between the inventor and the 
R&D team, whereas in project 2 the inventor had no opportunities to influence the idea’s 
development.  
 
5.2 Coordination mechanisms 
An open-door policy was a prevalent practice which promoted openness and lowered the 
threshold to start conversations with colleagues. Prolonged coffee break discussions were also 
useful in directing the expertise of a wide range of employees towards pressing matters. These 
practices increased understanding of the idea and promoted assimilation and transformation in 
project 1. Furthermore, after successful manufacturing tests in project 1, the good news spread 
very quickly throughout the relevant organizational functions due to interfaces which promoted 
cross-functional knowledge exchange, and helped grow the coalition to promote the idea: ‘We 
gathered together a reasonably large group of managers from sales, manufacturing, and R&D, 
and presented our results to them. That was the moment when the sales people got interested and 
started to explore the market potential.’ (R&D Manager) 
There was a significant difference in the two inventors’ interactions with Steel Inc.’s R&D 
unit. In project 1, the inventor had a long and diverse history in the company and wide networks. 
Unlike the entrepreneur in project 2, he was able to promote the idea’s acquisition and assimilation 
by proposing it to many R&D employees. A vital part of the team in project 1 was a product 
manager who acted as a boundary spanner across functional borders. He had deep understanding 
of informal organizational power structures and could advance transformation by formulating the 
message in appropriate terms, facilitating interactions, and convincing top management.   
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Table 7: SIMs in the studied projects 
SIM Project 1 Project 2 Related AC 
capability 
Socialisation mechanisms 
Connectedness Wide networks within the 
organization helped the 
inventor recruit supporters. 
Lack of connections between 







Lack of shared technical 
language between the inventor 
and R&D managers decreased 
trust and credibility and limited 
knowledge exchange. Shared 
backgrounds and language 
increased trust and facilitated 
knowledge exchange among 
R&D employees. 
Lack of shared technical 
language between the inventor 
and R&D managers decreased 




Values and norms Values and norms were dominated by conservativeness and risk 






Open-door policy and coffee 
room discussions promoted 
informal knowledge exchange 
across functions. 
Knowledge transfer practices 






Strong links between 
organizational functions 
facilitated market launch. 
Idea development was 




Job rotation Helped the inventor form 
valuable links throughout the 
organization. 




Boundary spanners Project team member with good 
social skills and networks 
helped create credibility for the 
idea. 




Formalisation Idea selection criteria 
disallowed highly uncertain 
ideas. 





5.3 Systems mechanisms 
Strong formalisation increased the projects’ reliance on other SIMs. Strict requirements for 
project proposals fit poorly with high uncertainties associated with radical ideas. According to a 
vice president: ‘The dilemma is that if you have a technological idea without a sophisticated 
commercial vision, it is very difficult to mould it into a form that would pass the decision gates.’ 
The idea in project 1 did not fulfil the selection criteria until quite late and lacked official status 
and development resources. Project 2 was in a pre-evaluation stage without clear goals and relied 
on the initiative of R&D employees. Project 1 was, however, promoted by coordination 
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mechanisms that were unavailable to project 2. Furthermore, an NDA which was signed to protect 
the idea in project 2 limited available resources to seven employees. 
 
6. Discussion 
Despite of the studies suggesting that radical innovation benefits from interactions with 
diverse partners, little is known of what is needed to absorb radical ideas from unusual sources. 
This study contributes by increasing understanding about the context-specificity of AC and 
provides suggestions for managers aiming to enhance their organization’s radical innovation 
capability by opening up to new idea sources. 
Faced with high uncertainty, the case company’s assimilation and transformation 
capabilities performed poorly. According to current understanding, AC level may vary with 
knowledge bases and partner characteristics (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). This study identifies two 
new contextual factors, idea radicalness and accustomisation with the idea source, which affect the 
utilisation of SIMs. 
Each of the AC capabilities (acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation) 
was associated with a specific challenge: (1) connecting inventors with the R&D unit, (2) finding 
resources and motivation to investigate the idea, (3) challenging perceptions of the company’s 
goals and capabilities, and (4) leveraging organization-wide support and competences to introduce 
novel products. Overcoming these challenges is difficult since the context combines multiple 
dimensions of uncertainty.  
First, unusual idea sources increase the level of uncertainty associated with ideas. Unusual 
inventors cannot benefit from socialisation mechanisms which generates a barrier to knowledge 
exchange and trust creation, and consequently to idea adoption. Nevertheless, among unusual 
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inventors, those with more contacts to and similarities with the R&D professionals may be able to 
utilise more SIMs. Idea radicalness is another source of uncertainty which is poorly suitable with 
certain socialisation (shared values and norms) and systems (formalisation) mechanisms because 
radical ideas often challenge companies’ existing capabilities and knowledge bases (Todorova and 
Durisin 2007) and their potential and risks are difficult to evaluate in their early stages. Therefore, 
under uncertainty, socialisation and systems mechanisms may produce the not-invented-here 
syndrome where organizational units reject innovative ideas from outsiders (Katz and Allen 1982). 
Instead, idea absorption relies on coordination mechanisms. Currently, the antecedents of the not-
invented-here syndrome are poorly understood (Burcharth, Knudsen, and Søndergaard 2014). The 
current study links the syndrome with underlying knowledge-related processes. Mechanisms 
which increase the breadth of knowledge exchange (coordination) are emphasised over those 
which promote its efficiency (socialisation, systems). So, diversity of idea sources and high 
uncertainty should be matched with diversity of utilised knowledge bases. 
The study presents a micro-level analysis of SIMs and AC capabilities (Martinkenaite and 
Breunig 2016). It demonstrates how SIMs can be applied to the investigation of the integration of 
radical ideas from unusual sources, and answers to calls for more qualitative AC process studies 
at the level of individuals (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008; Volberda, Foss, and Lyles 2010). Especially 
the early stages of radical idea development are highly reliant on the initiative of individuals (Reid 
and de Brentani, 2004). The study shows how individual-level interactions may influence project-
level success and ultimately explain firm-level capabilities.  
The findings suggest that an organizational culture which promotes openness, learning, and 
trying out new ideas (Herrmann, Gassmann and Eisert 2007) facilitates the creation of AC for 
radical ideas. Furthermore, the value of boundary spanners in bringing ideas into the R&D unit is 
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emphasised. Companies may proactively search for new ideas by establishing specific idea scout 
positions (Whelan et al. 2011) and organising idea contests (Elerud-Tryde and Hooge 2014), or 
reactively maintain receptiveness by establishing idea channels (Ahmed 1998) or adopting IT-
based idea management tools (Montoya-Weiss and O’Driscoll 2000). This study suggests that 
employees which manage these interfaces should be recruited from R&D so that they are socialised 
with those who will continue idea development. This generates initial trust and decreases 
suspicions towards the ideas. Moreover, radical ideas from unusual sources might require 
incubation before integration into the R&D unit. Passing formal selection gates and attracting the 
interest of R&D employees becomes easier if the idea has been pre-developed by a separate unit 
(O’Connor and DeMartino 2006). This enables the use of a wider range of SIMs.  
Finally, it is important to ensure connections across organizational borders. Cross-
functional teams, job rotation, and informal interactions should be promoted to fully utilise the 
knowledge base of the company. Similarly, NDAs limit interactions among employees and should 
be avoided when dealing with highly uncertain ideas.  
7. Conclusions 
The ability to absorb radical ideas from new sources is important for companies in dynamic 
environments. It is, however, difficult for incumbent companies because high uncertainties require 
new management approaches. The development processes of two radical ideas from unusual 
sources in an incumbent global steel company are analysed by evaluating four AC capabilities 
(acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation) and related SIMs. Especially 
assimilation and transformation capabilities performed poorly in the studied projects because of 
limited usefulness of socialisation and systems mechanisms. 
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This study suggests that AC capabilities may be context-specific. Two contextual factors 
are identified: radicalness and accustomisation with the idea source. Their effects are explained by 
underlying SIMs of which performance is contingent on these factors. Especially strong 
formalisation and socialisation within the R&D unit may work against highly uncertain ideas. 
In the steel industry, radical innovations are rare and difficult to develop. While such 
circumstances provide opportunities to identify challenges in idea development processes, it limits 
the generalizability of the results. The industry should be acknowledged as a potential variable 
which may influence the findings. Future research should examine SIMs and AC in industries with 
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Supplementary Material: Project Descriptions 
Project 1 – a technical employee as the inventor 
The inventor was a senior employee who had worked his whole career in the company. Throughout his career, 
he had held various positions in several functions, such as a technician in R&D, a supervisor in quality control, and a 
technical advisor. Because of his long history within the company he had good contacts to a number of people in 
different functions, both to blue-collar workers and managers. He was known to be very social and creative and to 
every now and then sit down with his colleagues to present new ideas. At the time of the studied invention, he was 
working as a supervisor in the quality control function. The invention was about a new technique in steel 
manufacturing which he believed could lead to new products with greatly enhanced properties. He presented the idea 
to several managers who turned him down on the basis that the idea was not metallurgically feasible. While he was 
very sure of his idea, he was not able to argue for it convincingly as he did not have higher education and related 
theoretical understanding. Finally after several dismissals, he managed to convince the head of the R&D unit to take 
a closer look. Afterwards, the inventor’s troubles in getting people involved were explained by his lack of credibility. 
Because he was not involved in production or R&D he was not considered to have the capacity to discuss technical 
issues. 
The head of the R&D unit made calculations based on the idea and concluded that there were no theoretical 
reasons why it would not work. Despite of this, he considered the idea risky as testing it in practice might lead to 
accidents which could harm the manufacturing equipment. The inventor, however, did not give up. Instead, 
encouraged by that the theoretical calculations were promising he continued trying to persuade others of the idea’s 
potential. This still proved difficult as he had a reputation of coming up with ‘crazy ideas’ and was not taken seriously 
by many. After some time, he managed to convince an R&D manager responsible of product design to take a look at 
it. The manager got interested and started to contact others. Because of his good reputation and a high success rate 
with past projects, he was easily able to get two others behind the idea: another R&D manager with long experience 
of working with a certain production line, and a product manager from the sales organization. 
At this point, the development of the idea did not have an official project status. Instead, it slowly started to 
proceed unofficially. The two R&D managers conducted laboratory tests which strengthened their belief of the idea’s 
potential. The next step in validating the new technique would have been to conduct large-scale tests at the production 
line. Here, the team faced lots of resistance. They invited their colleagues to discuss manufacturing tests but the idea 
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was rejected. The team members described the reaction as ‘typical resistance to anything new’ but at the same time 
admitted that there were still lots of unknowns in whether the production facilities were suitable for manufacturing 
the new product. 
After the unofficial project team was formed, the original inventor was not actively involved anymore. The 
three remaining members championed the development of the idea, each of them having their own particular strengths. 
The first R&D manager was responsible of designing how products are manufactured and had the power to decide on 
what was done at the production line. The other R&D manager was very experienced with the production line that 
was used to manufacture the test batches. He was able to evaluate that the risks were not too high and that the tests 
were feasible to run. Finally, the product manager had very good social skills and was able to persuade many key 
decision makers behind the idea. Moreover, all of them had technical credibility within the organization. 
The team decided to conduct the manufacturing tests secretly on the side of another project. The R&D 
managers, taking care of the technical analysis, planned how the manufacturing tests could be carried out in practice 
and how to minimize risks. One night, they ran the tests and the outcome was successful. People from several 
departments came to look at the product and saw that it had very high potential. After this success, the product manager 
started campaigning for the idea to be acknowledged by the top management. He created a business plan, which he 
thought was exaggerated at the time, and was able to explain the idea in a way that convinced the top managers. He 
also made test deliveries of the new product to customers and got positive feedback, which further strengthened the 
case. 
After getting top management behind the idea, the idea got an official project status and resources were 
allocated for its development. More tests were made and, despite a few setbacks, appropriate manufacturing methods 
were discovered. The new technique required new investments in the production line which were made after its 
potential and feasibility were confirmed. 
At first the new product was sold to existing customers as an improved version of an existing product. The 
new method improved product quality while lowering the production costs. Because of its improved properties, 
existing customers found new uses for the product which further increased its sales. Additional development of the 
manufacturing method led to the discovery of a new-to-the-world product group. So, besides the improvements to 
existing products, the invention created a new technological trajectory. Because initially there were no markets for 
such products, the company put a lot of effort into contacting potential customers and creating demand for it. To 
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exploit the new technological opportunities, the company moved to new markets both in terms of industry and 
geography. In the end, the sales exceeded the initial business plan estimates hundredfold. 
 
Project 2 – an external entrepreneur as the inventor 
The second idea originated from an entrepreneur who had established his own small business around a new 
method of manufacturing steel. He had manufactured sample products for several applications based on the new 
method and had gotten very promising feedback from potential customers. He saw that the potential of the method 
was very high but he was not able to exploit it by himself in a large scale. Therefore, he offered the idea to the Steel 
Inc. wishing that it would lead to great advances in the steel industry and compensations for him. He contacted the 
CEO of the company who passed the message to the R&D unit. Two R&D managers then proceeded to meet the 
inventor.  
The initial reception of the idea was positive. Its potential was evident and applications could be found from 
many areas. An R&D director told that while it was apparent that the inventor did not have much education it was 
obvious that he knew what he was talking about. There were, however, doubts about two things. First, whether the 
technology works as the inventor had told, and second, how it would fit into the company’s product portfolio. The 
idea was sent to the R&D unit for investigation. It did not have an official project status. Instead, it was at a pre-
evaluation stage of the innovation process. The investigation, however, proceeded very slowly. Typically, new product 
ideas originate from the R&D unit. If external parties are involved they are universities and research centres with 
strong ties to the R&D unit. This idea was exceptional in that the impetus to study it was given top-down by the CEO 
himself. The downside was that nobody within the R&D unit was personally committed and motivated to research the 
idea. Everyone seemed to have more pressing matters to work on and the externally originated idea was a low priority.  
While the technique proposed by the inventor had not been commercially utilized anywhere in the world, a 
couple of academic studies were found related to it. The studies confirmed that the idea had great potential but at the 
same time the investigators became suspicious that perhaps every property the inventor had suggested could not be 
attained. At this point, there were still lots of uncertainties about how the manufacturing of the product would work 
in practice and what the outcome would be like. The next steps would have been to analyse the samples provided by 
the inventor and to order small test batches from partners with suitable production lines for its manufacturing. 
Metallurgical sample analysis was, however, considered not to be likely to provide any new knowledge that could not 
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be derived from the literature. Manufacturing tests would likely have led to increases in understanding of the product, 
but conducting them is expensive. In the end, there was nobody who was willing to promote the idea to be sent for 
manufacturing tests. Decision on the idea’s future was stalled for a couple of months, until the entrepreneur was given 
a report which stated that this type of material could not be manufactured in the company’s current production facilities 
and there would be no further collaboration. A business plan was never made, but those working with the idea were 
doubtful about whether new products based on it would fit in to the company’s scope. While they agreed that there 
would likely be new business opportunities, the problem was that fully exploiting them would have required moving 
into new market segments. 
During its investigation, the idea was protected by a non-disclosure agreement which restricted discussion on 
the idea to a small group. This was considered harmful as the interviewees emphasized that the early development of 
new ideas usually benefits a lot from informal discussions, for example during coffee breaks. In this project, practices 
for leveraging the expertise of a wide range of colleagues could not be used which limited the opportunities to analyse 
and evaluate the idea. An R&D director argued that because the production processes are so complex, dozens of 
employees in different positions should be involved when designing new products. The inventor was in no way 
involved in the investigations made in the case organization. The R&D managers did not consider him valuable in 
analysing the material or its manufacturing. This can be partly explained by differences in the use of technical 
language. An R&D director mentioned that someone who has spent his whole life welding stuff in a garage would be 
better equipped to discuss with the inventor than anyone from his unit. 
 
 
